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Truth-telling and the Asymmetry of the
Attitude to Truth-telling to Dying Patients in
Latvia
Ivars Neiders, Vija Sile, Vents Silis
Department of Humanities, Riga Stradins University
is article deals with concerns related to truth-telling in interaction between the
doctor and the dying patient, exploring such issues as conicting duties of veracity
and non-malecence, truthfulness and deception, and reasons behind physicians’
decisions either to withhold or to disclose information about patients’ diagnoses
and prognoses. It focuses on various attitudes to truth-telling to dying patients,
such as symmetry and asymmetry, both of which can be positive and negative.e
empirical part of the article reports on the methods and results of the qualitative
study carried out in Latvia during the summer of 2012. is study was based on
the assessment of three case scenarios from the quantitative instrument designed
by Dalla-Vorgia et al. in 1992. By means of semi-structured and focus-group in-
terviews, evidence was gathered about physicians’ and medical students’ attitudes
towards truth-telling, which allows the drawing of conclusions about the presence
of asymmetry and symmetry in both cases. Additionally, an insight about the stan-
dards used for making decisions in case scenarios was gained and the origins of
these standards were explored, revealing the aermath of a gradual evolution from
the ethics of the Soviet era to modern standards of medical ethics.
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1. Introduction
It is dicult nowadays to avoid being shocked to discover that the virtue of
sincerity in physician-patient relationship was neglected in almost all ethical
codes until the middle of the 20th Century. Neither the Hippocratic Oath
nor any other important document in the long tradition of medical history
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pays any attention to this virtue.1 It was not that long ago (in 1927) when
Joseph Collins claimed that “every physician should cultivate lying as a ne
art” (Collins 2006, 607). However, a littlemore than six decades later, the au-
thors of arguably one of the most inuential monographs in contemporary
bioethics felt justied in making the following diagnosis:
By contrast to this traditional disregard of veracity, virtues of candor
and truthfulness are among themost widely praised character traits of
health professionals in contemporary biomedical ethics. (Beauchamp
and Childress 1994, 397)
It has been pointed out bymany authors (e.g. Veatch 1989) that the most
important changes in physicians’ attitudes toward truth-telling took place
during the 1970s when—according to surveys conducted—more and more
doctors became aware that important details about diagnosis and prognosis
should be disclosed to patients. In a way, this can be interpreted as a reac-
tion to the feeling shared by a majority of patients that they have the right
to know their condition.2 But, without doubt, it is more likely that there
is more than one reason for this paradigm shi. Beauchamp and Childress
(1994, 398) mention at least seven dierent factors that caused the change
of attitude towards disclosure: (1) more treatment options for cancer be-
came available; development of treatment of cancer (2) improved rates of
survival from some forms of cancer; this in turn (3) altered societal atti-
tudes about cancer;3 moreover (4) attention to patient’s rights has consid-
erably increased, and (5) fear of malpractice suits grew accordingly; at the
same time (6) physicians started to recognize communication as an eective
means of enhancing the patient’s understanding and compliance; nally, (7)
medicine has increasingly become a collective enterprise and relevant infor-
mationmust be shared with other members of teams in hospitals. To this we
would like to add that nowadays when information of varying quality and of
dierent levels of complexity is abundantly available from dierent sources
on the internet, themajority of patients have the possibility to gather the rel-
1 In fairness, there have been exceptions. For example, S. Bok (1999, 224) refers to the Jewish
physician Amatus Lusitanus (1511–1568) as one of the few who made a strong appeal to
the principle of honesty. One of the earliest and most prominent defenses of honesty in
medical practice was made by C. Cobat in his essay “e Use of Truth and Falsehood in
Medicine: An Experimental Study,” published in 1909 (See Katz 1984, 25). For a valuable
and short account of the history of physicians’ attitudes to truth-telling, see (Katz 1984,
1–29).
2 For references to the relevant surveys, see (Veatch 1989, 182–185). See also (Tuckett 2004,
501–502).
3 However, the myths surrounding cancer that were so vividly described more than three
decades ago by S. Sontag (1990) are far from dead.
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evant data by themselves. As a consequence, physicians’ ability to keep their
patients in the dark about their condition has radically diminished.
In general, there seems to be a widespread consensus that, all things be-
ing equal, it is a physician’s duty to tell the truth to their patients, even in
cases where the news is very bad. is attitude hardly needs any defense
nowadays. However, one may ask to what degree this phenomenon applies
to non-Western or Eastern European countries. e evidence provided in
many studies suggests that in other cultures the attitudes to truth-telling can
be considerably dierent. For example, one study (Shahidi et al. 2007) con-
ducted in Iran showed that most caregivers in the country are opposed to
disclosure to their cancer patients. In Japan, most cancer patients are not
told about their diagnosis (Tuckett 2004, 503). Dalla-Vorgia et al. report
that Greek doctors “do not feel obliged to disclose the truth in the same way
as American or British doctors ” in any case, they oen assume that patients
do not really want to know the truth (Dalla-Vorgia et al. 1992, 70). In China,
silence surrounds terminal illness and diagnostic disclosure is the family’s
responsibility (Tuckett 2004, 503). A similar practice is quite common in
Turkey as well (Nuket 2003). Such examples from non-Western countries
can be easily multiplied.4 On the other hand, some have suggested that the
situation is far from static and the number of physicians advocating open-
ness is gradually increasing (Shahidi 2010, 590).
One of themost powerful arguments used by the defenders of disclosure
is the existing discrepancy between physicians’ and patients’ attitudes, i.e.,
a number of empirical studies indicate that in spite of the fact that many
physicians assume that patients generally do not want to learn the sad truth
about their condition, most patients express the desire to know news even if
it is bad.5 Moreover, what is paradoxical in the case of physicians is a sort of
double standard in their attitude toward truth-telling, i.e., on the one hand,
most medical professionals say that they would not speak openly to their
patients, but, on the other hand, they themselves would wish to be told the
truth.6 We call this the asymmetry of the attitude to truth-telling (AATT).
We think that this phenomenon is of particular interest as it is a spectacular
application of double standards and, provided that it exists, its occurrence
4 See references in (Shahidi et al. 2007, 216) and (Shahidi 2010, 589–590) and the discussion
of (Jotkowitz et al. 2006).
5 See (Veatch 1989, 183).
6 is phenomenon was particularly emphasized by Higgs (2006, 614; originally published
in 1985). Although Higgs does not mention any study that supports his statement, the
evidence is not hard to nd. See, for example, (Sullivan et al. 2001). Nevertheless, how
widespread this phenomenon is is far from clear, as there is data which suggests the op-
posite. Spiro and Mandell (1998, 153) have observed that when physicians turn ill, they
themselves prefer to be treated in paternalistic fashion.
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may be considerably diminished just by pointing it out.
e default modus operandi of Soviet health care professionals was pa-
ternalism; patients’ role in decision making was rather limited and cancer
patients were usually kept in the dark about their condition. Many doc-
tors now working in Latvia’s health care system received their degrees when
Latvia was part of the Soviet Union and it is not unreasonable to suppose
that, in spite of the ocial view that paternalism should be abandoned, it is
quite widespread among health care professionals. But this is, as yet, only a
guess, since there is no evidence that would support such a claim. From the
legal point of view, patients should receive relevant information about their
condition and make choices that are informed. According to the “Law on
the rights of patients” (Section 6.1):
Medical treatment is permissible if a patient has given the informed
consent thereto.e patient has the right to ask questions and receive
answers prior to giving the informed consent.
e law particularly stresses patients’ rights to receive information about
their diagnosis and prognosis and other relevant aspects regarding their con-
dition (Section 4.3):
A patient has the right to receive information regarding his or her state
of health from the attending physician, including regarding the di-
agnosis, the plan for medical treatment, examination and rehabilita-
tion of the disease, the prognosis and consequences, the functional
restrictions caused by the disease and the opportunities for prophy-
laxis, as well as the right to receive information aer examinations
and surgical or other type of invasive intervention performed within
the framework of medical treatment regarding the results of themed-
ical treatment, regarding the previously unforeseen outcomes and the
reasons thereof. (Emphasis added)
It is admitted in the law (Section 4.7) that, although patients have rights
to this information, there may be conditions under which this right can be
le unfullled, i.e., if a physician has “information or facts” that indicate
that the disclosure of clinical knowledge can signicantly threaten “the life
or health of the patient or other persons”.
Unfortunately, there are no guidelines about how the law should be ap-
plied in particular types of cases.erefore, every physician is free to inter-
pret the requirements according to his or her subjective understanding of
which “information or facts” should be considered as life or health threat-
ening. e requirement of protection of the interests of unspecied “other
persons” is even more confusing. What could the nature of a physician’s re-
lationship to some third party be, such that it would override his or her pri-
mary duties toward the patient? And why should the patient’s right to know
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the truth be ignored in favour of some other person’s right not to know it?
All these ambiguities leave a lot of space for a variety of practices, which
result in gross irregularities in the provision of essential health care.
e fact that medical students do not receive any formal training in
making such decisions does not help, either. Moreover, the “Ethical Code
of Latvian Physicians” adopted by the Society of Latvian Physicians in 1995
is rather wanting in this regard. ere is only one sentence that may refer
to the issue under consideration, of which the proper meaning is far from
clear. In the section “Responsibility to the Profession andOther Health Care
Professionals” (and not in the section entitled “Physicians responsibility to
patients”, as one naturally might think) it is said that: “Profession demands
physicians to be honest to their patients”. What exactly the nature of this
demand is le unclear. As a consequence, it is very hard to tell what kind of
policy of disclosure patients can expect from their physicians and howphysi-
cians should make their decisions about disclosure, i.e., whether or not can-
cer patients should be informed about their diagnosis and prognosis, how
much information should be disclosed, and how reasoning about particular
cases should be conducted.
In our research, we try to minimize the informational vacuum that sur-
rounds the practice of patient-physician communication in Latvia. Our pri-
mary aim is to gain some insight into the current attitudes of Latvian physi-
cians to truth-telling. We intend to explore the views of practicing physi-
cians, the information they disclose to cancer patients, the standards they
apply in order to decide whether cancer patients should be informed or
not, howmuch information patients need, whether or not patients’ relatives
should be involved, etc. In particular, we want to investigate the presence
of AATT. Additionally, it seems useful and interesting to us to compare the
attitudes of physicians to those of medical students, as the latter have not
been exposed to the paternalism which was prevalent in the Soviet era.
2. Some remarks on the concepts of this study
Before we turn to the methods and the results of our research, we would like
to comment on the concepts that we use. We have already introduced the
concept of AATT. It is obvious that if there is asymmetry of the attitude to
truth-telling, then there must be symmetry also (SATT). In fact, it is useful
to distinguish two dierent kinds of SATT. If a person A believes that he or
she must tell the truth in a particular context, and at the same time he or
she wants to receive the same treatment from others, we call this positive
SATT. If, on the other hand, a person A believes that he or she may not
tell the truth in a particular situation, and he or she in a relevantly similar
situation prefers not to be told as well, then we call this negative SATT. In a
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similar vein, a distinction can be drawn between two types of AATT. Positive
asymmetry would be a case where a doctor is not completely truthful to
patients, yet wishes to receive the whole truth in the same position. Negative
asymmetry, by contrast, would involve disclosure of information to patients,
while wishing not to be informed in one’s own case.e existence of negative
asymmetry was conrmed during the research.
Doctor wants Doctor wants
disclosure if taken non-disclosure if taken
terminally ill terminally ill
Disclosure by Positive SATT Negative AATT
doctor to patients
Non-disclosure by Positive AATT Negative SATT
doctor to patients
Table 1. Demonstration of symmetry and asymmetry of doctors’ attitudes to-
ward truth-telling in serious clinical situations. Personal wants of the doctor
should he be taken seriously ill regarding disclosure or non-disclosure of the
clinical situation are set against the clinical practice of the doctor when he or
she is dealing with similar situations in his or her patients.is table demon-
strates the meaning of concepts used in this paper. SATT implies freedom from
duplicity whereas AATT implies duplicity.
e subject of our study is truth-telling. However, we cannot resist noting
that in a way the term is a misnomer. For, rstly, as already noted by Sissela
Bok (1999, 6, 227), in this particular context it is truthfulness and not truth
that is at stake, i.e., the subject of our discussion is not the concept of truth
but the virtue of truthfulness or, to be more specic, sincerity, a virtue that,
according to Bernard Williams, is constituted by trustworthiness in speech
(Williams 2002, 94). Secondly, if the opposite of truth-telling is lying, then
it should be stressed that lying is not the only way in which a physician may
fail to act according to the demands of the virtue of sincerity. Let us assume
that a lie is:
An assertion, the content of which the speaker believes to be false,
which is made with the intention to deceive the hearer with respect
to that content. (Williams 2002, 96)7
Now, it is clear, that in order to deceive somebody it is not necessary that
the speaker makes an assertion that he or she believes to be false. A true as-
7 It may be argued that this denition has many problems, but this is not relevant to the
point we want to make here. For a recent discussion of the concept of lying, see (Carson
2010, Ch. 1).
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sertion can do the job as well.8 It may be true that most cases of lying are
cases of attempted deception, but it is certainly true that not all cases of at-
tempted deception or cases of [actual?] deception are cases of lying.9 More-
over, it is not only lying and deception that we should concern ourselves with
in physician-patient relationships. In this context, saying nothing and keep-
ing patients in the dark about their diagnoses and prognoses may be no less
objectionable.10 Towithhold information to which patients have a rightmay
be as wrong as lying to them or deceiving them. Of course, some of these
practices are arguably worse than others, but, again, whatever position one
accepts makes no dierence for our purposes. We merely want to point out
that when we discuss truth-telling, we have inmind issues that surround the
virtue of sincerity in the physician-patient relationship, not just truth-telling
narrowly understood, i.e., as making assertions that the speaker believes to
be true.
3. Methods
Two populations were examined in our study: medical professionals and
medical students. Participation was anonymous and completely voluntary.
When sampling medical professionals, we chose a variety of gradual sam-
pling strategy known as the stratied purposeful sample, which aims to: “cap-
ture major variations rather than to identify a common core, although the
latter may also emerge in the analysis” (Patton 1990, 174). is strategy al-
lows for the collection of both typical and atypical cases, encompassing the
spectrum almost as comprehensively as a full maximum variation sample.
Moreover, in the face of such diculties as the absence of funding and lim-
ited time and personnel, this is one of the most optimal research strategies.
Participants were distinguished according to their speciality, gender,
years of experience and place of residence (capital or other city). At the
present moment, the number of medical professionals participating in the
study is ten (n=10).
Speciality Gender Experience (years) Place of residence
Anaesthesiologist- female 10–15 capital city
reanimatologist
General practitioner female 25–30 small city
Oncologist- female 25–30 capital city
chemotherapist
General practitioner female 25–30 small city
8 For an excellent discussion of this topic, see (Williams 2002, 100–110).
9 Cf. (Carson 2010, 56.).
10is problem was famously raised by Katz (1984).
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Speciality Gender Experience (years) Place of residence
General practitioner female 30–35 small city
oracic surgeon male 20–25 capital city
oracic surgeon male 20–25 capital city
Oncologist male 20–25 capital city
Oncologist male 20–25 small city
Neurosurgeon male 25–30 capital city
Table 1. Sample description of the medical professional population.11
Our research is still a work in progress, so the sample size of medical pro-
fessionals is expected to grow. However, the spectrum of views regarding
truth-telling, as well as the presence and origins of asymmetry of the atti-
tude to truth-telling, has emerged clearly enough to be worth publishing.
e method of gathering the data about the practices of medical profes-
sionals was qualitative, semi-structured interviews, which took place from
May to August 2012. e length of interviews was between 30 minutes and
1 hour. Some interviews were taken in discreet settings, such as university
study rooms and doctor’s oces, while others were given in less discreet
places, such as public cafeterias. Since the choice of location was le to the
subjects themselves, we have no reason to believe that this aected the qual-
ity of data in any negative way.
Another data-gathering method was focus group interviews, employed
in order to gather data aboutmedical students’ attitudes towards truth-telling
and related issues in the rst and second year of their studies.is method
is “most useful for getting at a complex underlying notion in a setting where
the sharing of experiences can help guide the other participants to greater
awareness. . . ” (Shank 2002, 48). No changes were made regarding the inter-
view questions: the students were asked to assess the same three scenarios
and to answer the same additional questions as the medical professionals.
ree such group interviews were carried out and the total number of sub-
jects was twenty three (n=23).
Medical students Number and gender Study year Date of interview
Group 1 n=7 (female =5) 1st 29 May 2012
Group 2 n=7 (female =6) 2nd 30 May 2012
Group 3 n=9 (female =6) 2nd 4 June 2012
11 For the sake of anonymity, the subjects will not be identied by either of these characteris-
tics in the text; numbers will be used instead, with no relation to the order depicted in this
table. e only exception will be the subject’s speciality, which will be mentioned only to
provide necessary context.
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Table 2. Sample description of the student population.
Questions for the semi-structured interviews and focus-group interviews
were composed by borrowing the three case scenarios from the quantitative
research tool (a questionnaire) developed by Dalla-Vorgia et al. (1992).ey
took the following form:
1. Do you believe that when someone is seriously ill and it is certain
(almost 100%) that they will die soon (for example in 2-3 months)
the doctor should tell them the truth?
2. Do you believe thatwhen someone is seriously ill and it is very prob-
able (for example 50%) that they will die, but not very soon (for ex-
ample in 5 years) the doctor should tell them the truth?
3. Do youbelieve thatwhen someone is seriously ill andhas a relatively
low probability (for example 10%) of dying, the doctor should tell
them the truth?
In addition to this, we also asked several additional questions to help
clarify the reasoning behind the answers given in the aforementioned sce-
narios, starting with a question addressing potential AATT:
1. If you were to assume the role of the patient in the described situa-
tions, what would you like the doctor to do?
2. What would you do if the patient did not ask any questions? Would
this mean that they did not wish to know?
3. Are there any factors (such as age, gender, nationality or educa-
tion) that would determine how much and what the patients wish
to know?
4. What has shaped your opinion about how to deal with such situa-
tions: a study course, the example of a colleague (both positive and
negative), your own experience?
4. Results
As Table 3 (found in the appendix at the end of the article) indicates, four
of the research subjects advocated the position of either complete or partial
non-disclosure of truth, while six advocated more or less complete disclo-
sure (with exceptions in certain cases).
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Assessing the rst case, where the terminal outcome was nearly 100%
certain and the expected lifespan was just a fewmonths, medical profession-
als were in agreement that, before giving the diagnosis, the patient’s psycho-
logical condition should be evaluated in order to determine how much in-
formation they are ready to receive and how it should be delivered to them.
Similar agreement emerged about the utmost care in announcing the prog-
nosis to the patients and their families.e dierences appeared on the issue
of howdoctors should balance their duty to tell the truth (veracity)with their
obligation to do no harm (non-malecence).e table displays a wide vari-
ety of attitudes ranging from a willingness to disclose as much as the patient
wishes to deliberate attempts to avoid revealing the truth to the patient.
Responses given by the students revealed many similarities to those of
the medical professionals. Assessing the rst case, the students stressed the
need to disclose the diagnosis, oen emphasizing a careful, emphatic way
of breaking the news. Regarding prognosis, the students split into two fac-
tions: one thought that patients should be informed about the severity of
their condition, but not about the average lifespan of 2-3 months, doubting
the precision of prognosis and expressing concerns about the likelihood of
psychological damage; the other faction thought that patients must be in-
formed about time too, in order to be able to spend their last days as they
see t. ere were notable dierences between the groups: in Group 2, the
dominant view was that expectancy should not be revealed, while in Groups
1 and 3, greater support was given to the opposite opinion.
Assessing the second case, where the risk of death was decreased to 50%
and the average lifespan increased to 5 years, the contrast between the at-
titudes towards truth-telling decreased as well. A cautious attitude towards
making a prognosis remained because of the higher degree of uncertainty,
which increases the possibility of making amistake. On the other hand, sev-
eral doctors admitted that to deliver such news is less emotionally demand-
ing because they are able to inuence the patient’s situation and apply their
medical skills and knowledge. It also allows them tomaintain optimism and
reasonable hope: “. . . it is a little bit easier for the doctor to announce such
news to the patient. I feel better. For me, it is terrible to accept that patient is
really going to die it cannot be helped and is going to happen soon. (. . . ) Yes,
the patient may have cancer, but cancer is curable—we put more emphasis
on the bright side” (S9). Others, on the contrary, saw the situation as less
favorable than in the rst case.
e students’ opinion was less varied: they generally agreed that the di-
agnosis should be given. To keep up the patient’s motivation and strength to
ght the disease, doctors should express all possible optimism andhope, em-
phasizing the possibility of either recovery or the possible ways of extending
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the limits of the prognostic lifespan. To achieve this goal, some thought that
instead of clearly announcing the diagnosis, whichmight cause unnecessary
shock and distress, doctors should somehow “explain the severity of the con-
dition” without actually mentioning the risk of dying, and then proceed to
discuss treatment options, appropriate lifestyle changes and regular check-
ups. Others argued that things should be called by their proper names and
that obscure language is inappropriate because in the long run it is counter-
productive; it is possible that the patient will fail to understand the risks and,
as a consequence, will not appreciate the need for check-ups and treatment.
ere was also disagreement among the students about whether the 50%
risk of dying and the average 5 year lifespan should be mentioned. Some
thought that the “numbers” are too relative to be of any use, and that men-
tioning them is likely to do more harm than good. Others disagreed, argu-
ing that it is essential for the patient to understand the risks and to be able
to make autonomous and informed decisions.
Assessing the third case, where the risk of death has shrunk to just 10%
and there are no limitations for lifespan, the attitudes towards truth-telling,
surprisingly, became more diverse again. Supporters of partial or complete
non-disclosure argued that the risks are comparable to those that any normal
person faces in their everyday lives, thus there is noneed to upset the patients
by mentioning the possibility of a terminal outcome. is is a surprising
view that may be caused by the weak understanding of probability of the
respondents, as 10% should be considered a rather high risk that is well above
that we face in our everyday lives.12
e students’ view of the third case was rather similar to that expressed
by the medical professionals. e students also focused on whether or not
a 10% risk is worth mentioning to the patient and what the justication for
either doing or not doing so would be. Some viewed this risk of death as
similar to the everyday risk of an average person associated with unfortu-
nate accidents.us, to avoid unnecessary stress, they would not inform the
patient, at the same time trying to persuade the patient to perform regular
check-ups and pursue a healthy lifestyle.e opposite party argued for com-
plete disclosure of risks as a necessary prerequisite for successful coopera-
tion that aims at regular monitoring of symptoms and appropriate lifestyle
changes.e third faction took the middle ground, arguing that whether or
not risks should be mentioned depends largely on how serious the patient’s
attitude is: if the patient appears careless, then the risks should bementioned
12 For comparison, according to Noordzij et al. (2010), the overall postoperative mortality
rate in the Netherlands was 1.85%. For their part, advocates of truth-telling stated that they
oen place special emphasis on the relatively small chance of dying, because they see it as
a useful motivational tool to facilitate changes in a patient’s lifestyle.
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to alarm them.
A certain amount of disagreement between the medical practitioners
was to be expected due to dierences in individual understanding of how
values and principles should be applied in practice. It is even less surpris-
ing, given the obscurity of regulative documents, especially the Law on the
Rights of Patients, which legitimises therapeutic privilege: the right to with-
hold information if there is a reason (i.e. certain “information or facts”)
to believe that it would cause a serious psychological threat to the patient.
However, the current variety of attitudes towards truth-telling means that,
within the same health care system, the standards of treatment may be rad-
ically dierent, making it very dicult to ensure quality and stability of the
health care provided.e task of social research (including ours) is to reveal
such irregularities and stress the need for addressing them on a number of
levels: in education, policy-making, ethics and so forth.
Similarly to the medical professionals, the students disagreed on the is-
sue of giving the prognosis in the rst and second cases and on revealing
the risks in the third case. Yet student opinions displayed much less vari-
ety, which gives reason to believe that in future the gross irregularities in the
health care provided will gradually level out. On the other hand, there is no
guarantee that opinions currently held by students will not change in future
due to, for example, pressure from older colleagues.
Now let us turn to an examination of the issue of symmetry and asym-
metry in regard to truth-telling.
Type of symmetrty/asymmetry Number of cases
Positive SATT 4
Negative SATT 3
Positive AATT 2
Negative AATT 1
Table 4. Presence of two types of symmetry and asymmetry of the attitude to
truth-telling.
As the Table 4 shows, there are four cases of Positive SATT, where doctors
advocated truth-telling and wished to be told the truth in the role of pa-
tient. ere are three cases of Negative SATT, where doctors did not advo-
cate complete veracity and did not wish to know the whole truth as patients.
One physician said that he would like to know the diagnosis but, as far as the
prognosis was concerned, preferred to be le in the dark. Another confessed
that she prefers hope to truth, even if that means being deceived by lying.
In two cases, the presence of Positive AATT was detected. In one, the
asymmetry was a matter of clarity and completeness: when informing pa-
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tients about their prognosis, the doctor admitted the possibility of some de-
gree of ambiguity and of not mentioning some unpleasant details, but as a
patient wished for absolute clarity and not to be deceived in any way (Pos-
itive AATT). In the rst case, the doctor would hint about diagnosis and
give a very vague prognosis. In the second case, the doctor would not reveal
the whole truth. As a patient, in both cases the doctor would like to receive
precise information about both diagnosis and prognosis.
In one case, the subject refused to answer the question, justifying their
refusal in the following way: “it is very dicult to apply this situation to
myself and to truly understand it, to really feel what people feel in such mo-
ments. When people are in such critical state, they change. As long as a
doctor is a doctor, that is one case, but when doctors themselves become
patients, then they are not doctors anymore—they are patients with medi-
cal education. It is a totally dierent perception of the world. . . ” e same
diculty was indicated by some other subjects, but nevertheless they did
specify their wishes in the role of a terminal patient. Hence, the reference
to cognitive limitations does not look very convincing. In the light of this
consideration, and certain biographical details, we believe that the unwill-
ingness to discuss the cases can be interpreted as an unwillingness to be in-
formed. us, we categorize this as a case of Negative AATT in which the
doctor would tell the truth to the dying patient, but would not wish to know
it in the role of patient.
e student population presentedmuch less variety. An absolute major-
ity displayed Positive SATT, while a few cases of rather mild Positive AATT
were detected. No cases of Negative SATT were detected.e greatest vari-
ety was found in Group 1, where we encountered a case of Negative AATT:
a person argued in favour of revealing both diagnosis and prognosis in the
second and third cases and advocated a personalized approach and family
involvement in the rst case. Yet, when assuming the role of patient, they
refused to receive any information about diagnosis or prognosis, allowing
only for diagnosis in the third case.
As to the origins of their standards, doctors mostly cited their profes-
sional and personal experience (death of a family member), their study and
work experience abroad, legislation and scientic documentation, locally
held postgraduate courses, as well as literature and lms. Almost everyone
made reference to Soviet-era practices; in the next section, this issue will be
discussed in more detail.
When asked about the origins of their standards, students generally cited
the same range of inuences asmedical professionals, without, of course, the
reference to Soviet-era practices. In addition to books, lms and personal
experiences, both in clinical settings and with dying relatives, references to
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university study courses could be traced. In most cases, these references
were indirect, appearing mostly through language and argumentation, not
through direct reference to a particular course in ethics or medical law.
Groups also diered in terms of the level of disclosure. In Groups 1 and
3, themost complete forms of truth-telling were dominant, while in Group 2
more disguised and indirect wayswere prevalent. However, the students also
voicedwell-grounded criticismof the validity of their current views: in every
group interview, it was pointed out that these opinions should be considered
as tentative and likely to change in the light of real-life experiences in their
professional settings.
Of course, there is a risk that, upon entering practice, students will adopt
the attitude of their more experienced colleagues who either do not have
such education or were educated according to principles of Soviet paternal-
ism. However, as reform in health care progresses, a growing number of
currently practicing physicians are re-educated and abandon the old pater-
nalistic practices. We believe that this tendency for positive change is rein-
forced by providing adequate education to the next generation of doctors.
5. Discussion
As Table 3 shows, it is rather dicult to reduce the thoughts of medical pro-
fessionals about the case to a single, clear, unambiguous opinion. To illus-
trate this complexity, the table contains such specifying entries as ‘diagnosis’
and ‘prognosis’. Giving a correct prognosis has particular relevance in the
context of truth-telling. Some doctors nd it dicult to reveal both kinds
of information, while for others it is not as dicult to give clear informa-
tion about their diagnosis as it is to announce their prognosis.e problem
seems to be rooted in the fact that the level of uncertainty, which is already
quite high in short-term prognoses, increases with the time span: the longer
it is, the larger is the likelihood of it being wrong.13 Yet the interviewed doc-
tors seemed to feel that, regardless of these diculties, they are expected to
be as correct about their prognoses as they are about their diagnoses. Mak-
ing a mistake would not only harm the patient, who would be preparing to
die on a particular day, but also undermine the health professional’s reputa-
tion by making them look either incompetent or as outright deceivers who
have betrayed the patient’s trust by making false promises.
is uncertainty was mentioned as one of the main reasons for limiting
the disclosure of information. Physicians stressed the fact that diagnosis is
never 100% certain, let alone the prognosis, and that, no matter how small,
there is always a chance either of a technical mistake in laboratory tests or
13 Similar results are reported in many other studies. See (Hancock et al. 2007, 511).
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of something unpredictable happening, from sudden death to a miraculous
recovery.
We detected two strategies that are used to avoid being blamed for mak-
ing an incorrect prognosis. e rst is to cite statistics about the average
lifespan of patients with such conditions: “Statistical data. . . is true and it
must be told” (S1).e second strategy is simply to avoid making any prog-
nosis, either by appeal to one’s limited human capacities (“I say that I am not
God, so I can’t tell how much time he has le, but he has to take into con-
sideration that his condition is severe. at’s how it is and that’s how I say
it” (S8)) or by appeal to something supernatural (“I usually tell the patients
that everything is in hands of a higher power, and they will live as long as
they have to live[. . . ]” (S6)). It should be pointed out that this way of talk-
ing does not imply that the physician has some strong religious beliefs. At
least, there is no evidence for that in our data. It is more likely that in this
case the reference to God or to supernatural forces is just a way of saying that
the physician’s knowledge is limited.eremay be at least two reasons why a
physician nds such expressions useful. Firstly, he or shemay think that that
the patient will understand the point if it is framed in this way. Secondly, this
may be a way of escaping the burden of responsibility to disclose informa-
tion. An unintentional case of not oering a prognosis may occur because
of an attempt to use non-technical, simple language instead of precise num-
bers and percentages that might sound puzzling to the patient. Sometimes
these phrases might reach such a level of generalization that they become
almost empty. Here is an example: “Oen people don’t like the term ‘relative
risk’—they don’t understand it. (. . . ) ey don’t have a good grasp of what
the percentage of risk means. And then I tell them: ‘You know, most likely
you would live longer if you did not have this diagnosis”’ (S10).
e rst thing that must be noted with regard to using uncertainty of
prognosis and diagnosis as a reason for limiting disclosure of information
is that it is based on a misunderstanding that has long been pointed out
by many authors.14 e physicians who justify their policies in this way
wrongly assume that truthfulness implies the truth, but this is not so. To be
truthful does not mean to tell the truth, as in many cases our knowledge—
especially in the contexts discussed in this paper—may be radically limited.
What truthfulness demands from a physician is disclosure of the relevant
information that he or she possesses, where relevance is determined from
the patient’s point of view. However, it is hard to tell whether physicians are
really confused about the demands of truthfulness or whether this is just a
strategy (used intentionally or unintentionally) to nd some excuse for lim-
iting the amount of information disclosed to the patient.is interpretation
14 See e.g. (Bok 1999, 227).
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may be supported by other observations suggested by our data.
Firstly, we got the impression that in the context of the cases discussed
physicians applied unusually high criteria for diagnosis and prognosis.15 Of
course, that may be explained by the fact that in the case of terminal ill-
ness the stakes are higher than usual, and physicians must be very careful
with the information that they possess. However, we are not sure that this
can be used as a justication for non-disclosure, as it can be argued that
for the same reason patients should be informed because, in the situation
where the stakes are high, the information becomes more important from
the patient’s point of view. Secondly, in some cases physicians openly ad-
mitted that information about prognosis or diagnosis is used to manipulate
patients. For example, an oncologist said that he uses the risk percentages
in order to inuence the patient’s decision to undertake treatment, which
is quite burdensome and accompanied with many unpleasant side eects:
“there also are patients who need to be heavily persuaded, scared into treat-
ment.” From the way in which physicians (and in many ways students, as
well) reacted to the cases we presented, it appears as if the epistemic stan-
dards used by physicians are adjusted in accordance with the intended use
of the information. If a physician wants to change a patient’s attitude toward
a particular therapy or life-style, then the possible risks of this or that condi-
tion are disclosed. If, on the other hand, the information has no therapeutic
use, physicians are not that eager to inform the patient and in some cases
even try to escape the duty to do so. For example, a general practitioner ar-
gued that it is a task of the oncological specialist to reveal the truth: “I am
careful, I am not a specialist—they are the ones who should explain it all.
(. . . ) To make a prognosis, no, that’s not my task. Why would I want to take
unnecessary risks and surplus responsibility? No, I don’t want that.” Simi-
lar evasiveness was observed regarding the use of the word “cancer”. Many
physicians we interviewed particularly stressed that they try to avoid men-
tioning it when possible. For example, a thoracic surgeon explained: “One
of the things we inform the patient about is that they have a malignant tu-
mor; we may sometimes avoid the word ‘cancer’, instead we say ‘malignant
tumor’ or that we found ‘bad cells’ or ‘malignant cells”’ (S3). However, not all
physicians subscribe to this attitude. In one case, we encountered a strategy
that is completely opposite. A general practitioner expressed the view that it
is (rather) essential to inform the patient that he or she has cancer, as this is
the term that is more familiar to an average person.
Another reason for non-disclosure is related to the issue of manipula-
tion, to which we just referred. is is the all too well-known argument
15 It must be noted that this is just our impression which is not backed by our data. We hope
to gather the relevant evidence in our future research.
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according to which the truth may harm patients, and, as non-malecence
is one of the basic principles of medical ethics, physicians may not tell the
truth to the patient if there are good reasons to believe that the truth will
harm them. e physicians we interviewed committed themselves to the
view that the truth about a terminal condition may have a devastating eect
on a patient’s psychological condition: they may succumb to severe depres-
sion, thus losing the ability to enjoy the few days that are le for them, or
even commit suicide. Hence, it is more important to maintain the patient’s
hope: “If someone is hopeless, then let them be hopeless in the documents,
but in real life there must be hope! Let it be false, but there must be hope!
at may be just a tiny, tiny ray of light, but still—patients must think that
maybe, just maybe they will get better, maybe the miracle will happen. I am
an old-school doctor, that is my opinion, and so it will remain” (S7). In a
similar vein, another doctor said: “If I told him straight away, then I would
kill him! If I said, ‘You will live for 2-3 months and that’s it’, I suppose they
would collapse and have no wish to ght for themselves. None at all!” (S8).
A neurosurgeon referred to cases of patients committing suicide aer learn-
ing the truth about their condition: “ese patients aremuchmore sensitive,
in comparison to terminal patients whose time has almost run out and who
are in a very bad biochemical state. . .ere have been cases in our hospital
where patients have jumped out of the window because of the depression
caused by nding out the diagnosis. (. . . ) I remember at least three to four
such cases.”
e force of this argument has been challenged in the literature from at
least two sides. Firstly, it has been mentioned that the claim is factually un-
true, i.e., the damages associatedwith disclosure are comparatively rare (Bok
1999, 234).16 Secondly, there are substantial benets from being informed,
for example, pain is toleratedmore easily, patient-physician relationships are
better, etc. (Bok 1999, 234). Whatever onemakes of these considerations, we
think that the practices of the physicians to whom we talked are too pater-
nalistic. True, there is evidence that bad news in some casesmay cause harm,
but at the same time our data suggests that many physicians use the argu-
ment as an excuse tomanipulate their patients. As can be seen from the quo-
tations above, many physicians see information as a sort of medicine that is
an integral part of treatment and, accordingly, the physician decides the tim-
ing and dosage, while the patient is mere recipient. In such a situation, the
patient’s point of view seems to be ignored. It must be noted, however, that
not all physicians subscribe to this kind of policy. Some physicians admitted
that truth may cause harm to the patient, but held that this is to be avoided
not by concealment but by compassionate communication. As one physician
16 See (Shahidi 2010, 590).
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said: “it can be stated empathetically, compassionately, in language that the
patient understands, without rhetoric or medical terminology, about which
he is not an expert. And my personal experience is that both patients and
relatives are very grateful about being told the truth, and not beating around
the bush. I should be told not in some kind of obscure way, but clearly, as
it is! (. . . ) Directly and clearly. Yes, the person will be shocked, but that is
the unavoidable reaction that must be experienced.” (S10) One example of a
cautious way of telling the truth is to make the process gradual: “I consider
whether to tell him all of this in one day, or in several conversations; to split
it into stages, so that the person can grasp and understand everything. But I
am absolutely convinced that truth must be told” (S9).
Finally, the third reason for non-disclosure is that there are patients who
just do not want to know the truth. Unfortunately, there is no data about pa-
tients in Latvia concerning their attitude towards truth-telling, but we can
speculate that due to the Soviet past, Latvian patients, in comparison to pa-
tients in the USA andWestern European countries, are more ready to accept
the paternalistic policies of physicians. In our interviews, physicians referred
to particular groups of patients who showed no interest in knowing their
condition. One such group is patients with substance abuse problems. As
an anaesthesiologist-reanimatologist puts it: “. . . a person who, in his 34 or
whatever years, has drunk himself to rock bottom, reaching the lowest level
of degradation. You can talk to him and tell him anything youwant; he is not
listening, not paying attention. He has such a severe case of liver failure that
it is a miracle he does not die, but he goes home and continues drinking”
(S5). Other doctors indicated that socially disadvantaged patients with low
education oen adopt an attitude of total indierence towards their health:
“ere are those who are not interested in anything.ey say: ‘Do what you
want to do, doc. If you need to operate, just go ahead.’ And I believe they are
not even listening to what I tell them” (S2). In such cases, doctors expressed
the feeling that their attempt to communicate the truth is bound to fail, and
felt justied in not making the eort: “It is not him asking us ‘Please, op-
erate on me, doctor!”, it’s as if we badly wanted to operate on him. As I see
it, patients with such an attitude towards health don’t need to be informed.”
(S3) Whether an attempt to increase the patient’s involvement in these cases
would be futile is hard to tell; to do so, we would need additional evidence.
Here again the physicians’ approach was not unied. Some did not even
mention the need to facilitate patient autonomy, while others clearly indi-
cated that it must be done and described their actions in this respect. One
described them as a “process of negotiation” (S1) which consists of repeated
eorts to convince reluctant patients to consider the consequences andmake
informeddecisions, especially if they involve refusing cancer treatment. Oth-
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ers talked about the necessity of explaining the nature of medical manipu-
lations: “Cooperation with the patient is essential—he has to understand
what I am doing and therefore I am trying to explain what I am going or
not going to do, and why. e principal purpose of the conversation is to
make him understand what is happening to him.”(S4) Still others referred
to the physician’s moral duties: “I have to explain that he has a cancer and
I am proposing to do this or that. e duty of the doctor is to inform, of
course.”(S9)
We assume that paternalistic attitudes and strategies are a legacy of So-
viet times. is issue arose in many interviews. Some physicians referred
to past practices in order to distance themselves from them: “Yes, I have re-
ceived some sort of postgraduate education—10 months in the UK, where I
saw that patients are very clearly notied about their diagnosis, not as it used
to be in our country some time ago. In Soviet times, when oering an onco-
logical diagnosis was absolutely prohibited, documents were lled inwith all
kinds of weird diagnoses, for example, “new formation” and similar rubbish
that does not even mean anything” (S3). Some noted that the policy of non-
disclosure was openly recommended to them by their teachers in medical
school. Although the majority of the physicians we interviewed distanced
themselves from the paternalism of the Soviet era, some of themmentioned
that there are still many physicians whose attitudes have not changed: “e
truth is that a good share of the people who are working there are of quite an
old age, so they act in accordance with the Soviet-era practice that requires
them not to inform anybody, and they keep on living by those standards.
ey just tell the patient that they have to go to this room and do that thing”
(S2). One of our interviewees explicitly associated their point of view with
paternalistic attitudes of the past, in spite of the fact that they were quite
aware that those practices are opposed to those that are ocially embraced:
“You know, this is my opinion, I am the old generation, the old-school doc-
tor, with a basic education from the era of Soviet socialism, when these di-
agnoses were kept from patients a closely guarded secret. I still have this
old thinking rooted deep inside of me.” (S7). So it appears that physicians’
attitudes toward past practices vary a great deal.
We think that it is reasonable to assume that disclosure policies have
undergone rather substantial changes during the last 20 years. We would
also like to speculate that there is some correlation between the age of the
doctor and their attitude towards truth-telling, i.e., physicians who started
their career in the Soviet era are less open with their patients than physicians
who were trained and started practicing later. At this point, however, we
have no evidence to substantiate this hypothesis and this is one of the tasks
of our future research. What we can say about the present state of aairs
74 Truth-telling and the Asymmetry of the Attitude to Truth-telling to Dying Patients
is that even those health care professionals who accept the new policy of
disclosure in some cases are not completely free from certain paternalistic
attitudes.
Part of the problem, we suggest, lies in the fact that physicians have not
received a formal training in communication skills and the moral problems
of truth-telling. is manifests itself in the way in which physicians talked
about their disclosure policies. In describing or justifying their practices of
disclosure, physicians rarely used ethical language. In one case a physician
referred to the concept of honesty, explaining that: “It is honest to the pa-
tient to inform them about the existence of such a risk, that this diagnosis
may lead to a fatal outcome, and the patientmust be informed about it.” (S3).
Later, they justied their practice with reference to the conception of rights:
“And, of course, in this case I don’t have the right to hide this from the pa-
tient.” Another specialist justied their practice of disclosure by saying that
it would be unethical not to tell the truth to a competent patient. In other
cases, the physicians justied their practices by referring to legal considera-
tions. For example, one of the physicians said that they do not disclose infor-
mation to patients’ relatives as it is against the Law on the Rights of Patients.
On one occasion, our interviewee pointed out that truth-telling is a matter
of the doctor’s reputation. It seems that, in this regard, practicing physicians
considerably dier from the medical students to whom we talked. Students
in their answers more frequently used moral and legal terms to explain or
justify their point of view. Many of them stressed that patients have rights
to know their condition.is, of course, may be due to at least two reasons.
Firstly, their thinking is relatively unaected by the practices of the Soviet
era. However, we would not say that they are completely free from this, as
many of the students that participated in our discussions already have some
clinical experience and have been exposed to the practices of their older col-
leagues. Moreover, paternalistic attitudes may have been acquired by other
means as well, e.g., through the family. Secondly, all the students in our
study were introduced to the terminology of rights during their rst year
in university, as they had a course in “Bioethics” and on “Law in Medicine”.
irdly, it is possible, of course, that the students have not become familiar
with the complexity of end-of-life situations in clinical practice.
Lack of formal training may correlate with a lack of reection about dif-
ferent moral priorities involved in the situations that we discussed in our
interviews and the physicians’ capacity to relate these situations to them-
selves as potential patients. is can be seen from the considerable level of
asymmetry detected in our study. We also noticed that in many cases where
physicianswere asked about their attitudes in the role of patient, it took them
more time than usual to formulate a point of view and in some cases they
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seemed to be uncertain about the view they had expressed.is is how one
of them formulated their answer to the question about whether they would
like to know the statistics concerning their lifespan: “I think even, that. . . I
think, I wouldn’t want. I think. . . yes, I wouldn’t want.” (S6) However, it
must be added that there are exceptions. In one case, a physician described
their policy with reference to the Golden Rule, stating that they would like
to be treated in the same way that they treat their patients: “I’m following
the principle ‘Do unto others as you would have them do to you.”’ (S4)
6. Some reservations about the method used
We are aware of the limitations and weaknesses of the semi-structured in-
terviewing technique, such as the problem of validity (no reliable criteria of
distinguishing truth from lies), self-deception, constructive nature of human
memory, and eect of social desirability. We are also aware of the dicul-
ties of interpreting and making generalizations that are related to the highly
subjective nature of the data gathered. Bearing all of this in mind, we have
reason to believe that skilful interviewing (sometimes involving two inter-
viewers at the same time), followed by careful analysis and description of the
results, can help to overcome these obstacles.
Limitations and weaknesses of the group interviews are the validity, re-
active eect (the feeling of being watched and studied), dominance of one or
two subjects, and diculty of analysis due to the subjective nature of data.
ese were compensated for by skilful moderation (sometimes involving
two or even three moderators at the same time), careful analysis and de-
scription of ndings.
e next step in our research would be to conduct a quantitative study
among the aforementioned populations, as well as patients, in order to de-
termine the impact of demographic factors on the issue of truth-telling in
Latvia, and to detect the quantitative dimensions of attitude to the asymme-
try to truth-telling.
7. Conclusion
To get a full picture of truth-telling policies, it would be necessary to conduct
a quantitative study not only of health care professionals’ attitudes, but of
patients as well. In this case, we would be able to tell whether there is any
discrepancy between what physicians disclose and what patients expect to
hear.
Our study showed that there is no commonpolicy of truth-telling shared
by all physicians and a sort of particularism that they dened as a patient-
centered approach to medicine. In practice, this may range from promotion
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of patients’ autonomy and informed decision-making to various degrees of
arbitrariness, occasionally even cases of paternalism. However, it is hard to
tell to what degree this is caused by the fact that the attitudes may dier with
the speciality of the health care professional. We think that a more unied
approach to truth-telling would be more helpful for patients, as in this case
they would know what to expect from the health care professional.
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78 Table 3.Medical professionals’ responses to the case scenarios.
Nr. Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Subject 1 It depends. (Truth.) It depends. (Truth.) It depends. (Truth.)
Diagnosis—patient-centered approach Diagnosis—yes Diagnosis—yes
Prognosis—general time Prognosis—certain risks, general time Prognosis—emphasizing risks,
general time
Subject 2 Truth. Truth. Truth.
Diagnosis—patient’s psychological condition Diagnosis—yes Diagnosis—yes
Prognosis—no certainty about death and time Prognosis—certain risks, general time Prognosis—certain risks, general time
Subject 3 It depends (Truth.) Truth. Truth.
Diagnosis—patient’s psychological condition Diagnosis—yes Diagnosis—yes
Prognosis—general time Prognosis—certain risks, general time Prognosis—certain risks, general time
Subject 4 It depends (Truth.) Truth. It depends. (Truth.)
Diagnosis—patient’s psychological condition Diagnosis—patient’s psychological condition Diagnosis—yes
Prognosis—general time Prognosis—general time Prognosis—certain risks, general time
Subject 5 It depends. (No.) No. It depends. (No.)
Diagnosis—patient’s psychological condition Diagnosis—no Diagnosis—informing relatives
Prognosis—informing relatives Prognosis—no Prognosis—informing relatives
Subject 6 No. Truth. It depends. (Truth.)
Diagnosis—it is assumed that they already know [. . . ] Diagnosis—yes Diagnosis—yes
Prognosis—time is uncertain Prognosis—risks and side eects Prognosis—yes
Subject 7 No. No. No.
Diagnosis—no, avoid clarity Diagnosis—task of a specialist Diagnosis—no
Prognosis—no, never; maybe relatives Prognosis—task of a specialist Prognosis—no
Subject 8 It depends. (Limited truth.) It depends. (Limited truth.) No.
Diagnosis—not all of the truth, just hints Diagnosis—patient’s psychological condition Diagnosis—no
Prognosis—general time P and, complications too Prognosis—no
Subject 9 Truth. Truth. Truth.
Diagnosis—patient’s psychological condition Diagnosis—yes, but carefully Diagnosis—yes
Prognosis—general time Prognosis—yes, but prognoses are unreliable Prognosis—yes, emphasizing risks
Subject 10 Truth. Truth. Truth.
Diagnosis—yes, but carefully Diagnosis—yes Diagnosis—yes
Prognosis—yes, but carefully Prognosis—yes, but carefully Prognosis—yes, emphasizing risks
